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## CAT

To try out CAT see <u>http://causalattribution.org:3000/</u>.

To read more about CAT (the Explainer) see http://causalattribution.org:3000/what\_is\_cat

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	CAT Introduction	
BN tools are quite fa They have been use Assessing evid Argument Ana Modeling & Po	amiliar by now; they've been around for decades. d for a great variety of tasks: lence (Fenton, et al., 2016 alysis (Nyberg, et al., 2022) ediction (Marcot & Penman, 2019; Arora, et al., 2019))	
<ul><li>Explanation</li><li>Hypothetical</li></ul>	Reasoning (Glymour & Danks, 2007)	Į.

Which of these involve causal reasoning?

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<b>CAT Introduction</b>	
BN tools are quite familiar by now; they've been around for decades.	
<ul> <li>Assessing evidence (Fenton, et al., 2016</li> <li>Argument Analysis (Nyberg, et al., 2022)</li> <li>Modeling &amp; Prediction (Marcot &amp; Penman, 2019; Arora, et al., 2019))</li> <li>Evaluation</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Explanation</li> <li>Hypothetical Reasoning (Glymour &amp; Danks, 2007)</li> </ul>	
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Which of these involve causal reasoning? Marked in green.



With this model we can reason probabilistically about all kinds of things. E.g., what's the average age of tenured academics?

This is a causal BN, but can't answer causal questions (using ordinary BN tools).



This BN can answer: What's the probability of tenure given white hair?

What we can't ask, and get a sensible answer for, is: How will bleaching my hair white affect my chances of getting tenure? (without special hacks)



This is the causal model that answers that question.

You can get it by:

- Hacking a BN (but has to be done just right!!)
- Using CAT (simples)

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CBNs v BNs	
Importantly, CAT can give you the verdict on causal attribution questions:	
<ul><li>Did A cause B?</li><li>How much did A contribute to B? More than C?</li></ul>	
According to a variety of causal criteria.	
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Caveat Emptor: CAT requires its models to be *causal*. With non-causal networks you will get nonsensical results.

Sourcing, and validating, a causal BN (e.g., machine learning, expert elicitation) is an issue that must precede use of CAT.





Prescientific verdict comes down to observations versus personal interventions. See the psychology of causal reasoning.



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Causal Criteria	
David Lewis's Counterfactual Criterion (Lewis, 1973):	
If A and B are distinct events that actually occur, then A caused B if and only if, were A not to have occurred, B would not have occurred.	
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Causal Criteria	
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The underlying intuition is close to universal: any cause makes a difference to its effect.	
One problem is how to formalize this intuition. CAT provides a platform for doing so, in many different ways.	
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How CAT will integrate into ABNMS Uploading CBNs Loading ABNMS BNs





























How to add new measures via GIT Hub

See <a href="https://github.com/voracity/CAT">https://github.com/voracity/CAT</a>



We've been talking about measuring the causal power of one variable over another by simulating an intervention on the putative cause. This is structurally distinct from just entering an observation about the cause. But now I want to make a few remarks about doing both at once: intervening on the cause where we have observed some other variables.

This fictitious example concerns a skin disease called Dermascare. Dermascare disease had two suspected causes: visiting polluted Podunk beach, or using contaminated Dunkalot sunscreen. The disease has two possible early symptoms: small bruises, and itchy skin. Researchers built this model based on the available hospital statistics. How much is the sunscreen to blame?



As we've already seen, the problem with just observing the people who used sunscreen is that the change in probability for them having the disease may be partly due to noncausal paths. Here, using sunscreen makes it more likely that the person visited the beach, which might be contributing to the dramatic increase in the probability of the disease.



When we use CAT to simulate an intervention on sunscreen, such as the randomisation shown here, we can break such noncausal paths, which guarantees that the remaining dependence is entirely due to the causal paths. Notice that using sunscreen has a slightly protective effect against the disease; the dramatic increase we saw previously was entirely due to visiting the beach.



But what if we have also observed that someone has visited the beach? Now, the first mistake one might make in interpreting the result would be to think that the dependence here is the causal power of sunscreen in general. This is equivalent to selection bias: if we want to know the causal power for the population in general, but we have selected (usually inadvertently) a disproportionate number of people who went to the beach, then the results may differ and a naive extrapolation would be misleading.

However, this is a perfectly legitimate measurement provided that it is interpreted correctly: it's the causal power of sunscreen on the disease that is observable among people who visited the beach.



Similarly, we can measure the causal power given the observation that someone has no bruises. A more subtle mistake in interpretation is to say that this is the causal power sunscreen really has (or had) in this subset of the population. But you're not seeing what sunscreen might have done to these people if it resulted in them not having bruises. You're only seeing the causal influence that is observable given that they ended up without bruises.



But even if you interpret the measurement properly, there is a more serious quantitative problem if you observe a common effect, i.e., a descendant of both the cause and the effect variable of interest. Here, the observation actually creates a noncausal path that the intervention on sunscreen doesn't prevent. Specifically, either sunscreen or the disease could cause itchy skin. When we apply sunscreen, we have partly explained the itchy skin observation, so it becomes weaker evidence for the disease, and the probability of the disease drops. Consequently, any measurement of the dependence between sunscreen and disease will be partly due to the noncausal component.

We will add a verbal and visual warning to this tool (e.g., colouring the variable red) if you have added an observation that created a noncausal connection of this kind. This will help prevent users from misinterpreting the result, and might persuade them not to add the observation after all.

## References

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